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* test: codeql for wikioperation * test: codeql not find suite * Move CodeQL analysis to dedicated workflow Extracted the CodeQL security analysis job from test.yml into a new codeql-analysis.yml workflow file for better separation of concerns and maintainability. * Update codeql-analysis.yml * de * 。
96 lines
2.9 KiB
Text
96 lines
2.9 KiB
Text
/**
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* @name Template string injection in code execution
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* @description Detects user input flowing into template strings that are passed to code execution functions
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* @kind path-problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @security-severity 9.3
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* @precision high
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* @id tidgi/template-string-injection
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-094
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* external/cwe/cwe-095
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*/
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import javascript
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import DataFlow::PathGraph
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/**
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* A call to a function that executes code dynamically
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*/
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class CodeExecutionCall extends DataFlow::CallNode {
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CodeExecutionCall() {
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// Direct code execution
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this.getCalleeName() = ["eval", "Function"] or
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// Electron-specific code execution
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this.getCalleeName() = "executeJavaScript" or
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// VM module code execution
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this.(DataFlow::MethodCallNode).getMethodName() = ["runInContext", "runInNewContext", "runInThisContext"]
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}
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}
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/**
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* A template literal that contains potentially tainted elements
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*/
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class TaintedTemplateLiteral extends DataFlow::Node {
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TemplateLiteral literal;
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TaintedTemplateLiteral() {
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this.asExpr() = literal
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}
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TemplateLiteral getLiteral() {
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result = literal
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}
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}
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/**
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* Configuration for tracking tainted data flow into template literals used in code execution
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*/
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class TemplateStringInjectionConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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TemplateStringInjectionConfig() {
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this = "TemplateStringInjectionConfig"
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}
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
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// Any parameter or property access could be user-controlled
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source.asExpr() instanceof Parameter or
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source instanceof DataFlow::PropRead or
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// IPC sources in Electron
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exists(DataFlow::CallNode call |
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call.getCalleeName() = ["on", "handle", "once"] and
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source = call.getCallback(0).getParameter(1)
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)
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}
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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// Template literal elements that flow into code execution
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exists(CodeExecutionCall exec, TaintedTemplateLiteral tl |
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exec.getAnArgument() = tl and
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exists(Expr element |
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element = tl.getLiteral().getAnElement() and
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sink.asExpr() = element
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)
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)
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}
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
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// JSON.stringify is a safe sanitizer
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exists(DataFlow::CallNode call |
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call = DataFlow::globalVarRef("JSON").getAMemberCall("stringify") and
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node = call
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)
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}
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}
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from TemplateStringInjectionConfig config, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink,
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CodeExecutionCall exec, TaintedTemplateLiteral tl
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where
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config.hasFlowPath(source, sink) and
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exec.getAnArgument() = tl and
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exists(Expr element |
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element = tl.getLiteral().getAnElement() and
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sink.getNode().asExpr() = element
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)
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select exec, source, sink,
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"Potential code injection: user input $@ flows into template string passed to " + exec.getCalleeName(),
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source.getNode(), "here"
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