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* test: codeql for wikioperation * test: codeql not find suite * Move CodeQL analysis to dedicated workflow Extracted the CodeQL security analysis job from test.yml into a new codeql-analysis.yml workflow file for better separation of concerns and maintainability. * Update codeql-analysis.yml * de * 。
83 lines
2.6 KiB
Text
83 lines
2.6 KiB
Text
/**
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* @name Unsafe use of webFrame.executeJavaScript with user input
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* @description Detects Electron webFrame.executeJavaScript calls with potentially tainted template strings
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* @kind path-problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @security-severity 9.0
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* @precision high
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* @id tidgi/electron-execute-javascript-injection
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* @tags security
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* electron
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* external/cwe/cwe-094
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*/
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import javascript
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import DataFlow::PathGraph
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/**
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* A call to webFrame.executeJavaScript
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*/
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class ExecuteJavaScriptCall extends DataFlow::MethodCallNode {
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ExecuteJavaScriptCall() {
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this.getMethodName() = "executeJavaScript" and
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(
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this.getReceiver().(DataFlow::PropRead).getPropertyName() = "webFrame" or
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this.getReceiver().asExpr().(Identifier).getName() = "webFrame"
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* Configuration for tracking unsafe executeJavaScript usage
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*/
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class ExecuteJavaScriptInjectionConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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ExecuteJavaScriptInjectionConfig() {
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this = "ExecuteJavaScriptInjectionConfig"
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}
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
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// Function parameters
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source.asExpr() instanceof Parameter or
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// Object property access
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source instanceof DataFlow::PropRead or
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// Deep link handlers
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exists(DataFlow::CallNode call |
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(call.getCalleeName() = "on" or call.getCalleeName() = "handle") and
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call.getArgument(0).getStringValue() = ["open-url", "second-instance"] and
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source = call.getCallback(1).getParameter([0..2])
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)
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}
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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exists(ExecuteJavaScriptCall exec |
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sink = exec.getArgument(0)
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)
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}
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
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// JSON.stringify sanitizes the input
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exists(DataFlow::CallNode call |
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call = DataFlow::globalVarRef("JSON").getAMemberCall("stringify") and
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node = call
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) or
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// Explicit type checks
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exists(DataFlow::CallNode call |
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call.getCalleeName() = ["isString", "isNumber", "isBoolean"] and
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node = call
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)
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}
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override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
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// Template string interpolation is a taint step
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exists(TemplateLiteral tl |
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pred.asExpr() = tl.getAnElement() and
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succ.asExpr() = tl
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)
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}
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}
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from ExecuteJavaScriptInjectionConfig config, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
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where config.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
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select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
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"Potential code injection in webFrame.executeJavaScript: user input $@ flows into executed code without proper sanitization",
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source.getNode(), "here"
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